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THE U:P,.CT ON THE t\.. VY 01" PUBLIC CCr;CEHN ilI'LH

C0XTROL Ci'

0: T:E 5in3 3Y OIL

POLLt:IC~

CHAPTER I
IN7riOJUC'l'ICN

A cursory glance at any of today's newspapers will probably disclose one or two articles on pollution problems.

Additionally, there

will be as well, several advertiser.tents by commercial firms, the government, or ecology groups espousing their programs for improving the
environment and appealli'% for help from the individual.

This increasing

concern with the environment has resulted in extensive programs being undertaken by both industry and government to reduce, prevent and
eventually eliminate pollution.

Durir.g the last six years alone, three

affiendments have been enacted to strengthen the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, * and no less than three international agreements have been
signed or brought into force to control pollution at sea. **
Much of this legislation is directed towards controlling oil
pollution.

Just what is behind this current wave of concern and what

has occurred to generate it?
Production.

The highly industrialized nature of today's

world has created an ever increasing demand for fossil fuels.

World

*The ~ater ~ua1ity Act of 1965, (Fublic Law 89-234); :he Clean
jiestoration hct of 1966, lPublic Law 89-753); and The ','iater
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, (Public ~aw 91-224).

~later

·;;-',,-The h:~ree;!(ent Concer-ning Pollution of t::e 3ea by Cil, June 1969
i;ort:l "';ea -act.}, the Interr.i:.ticnal Convention :.elating to Intervention on the Eigh .3ee.s in Cases of Cil Pollution Casualties, November'
1969, and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pol.Lution I;an:a;.:e, j·loverr,ber 1969.
I. Th2

1

production of oil in 1969, for

e~ple,

was over fifteen billion

barrels,l almost double the 1960 production of about 7.8 billion
2
barrels.
Twenty-two nations ?roduced 17~ of the 1969 production,
about 2.2 billion barrels, frou. offshore vells. 3 The well known
Santa Barbara Charillel ir.cident and several recent oil spills in the
Gulf of :·.exico have focussed public attention on the hazards of offshore production.

Increasing production in this area will add

significantly to the problems of oil pollution control at sea.
Transportation.

Approximately 60:.6 of the present world

production of oil is transported by sea and it is estimated that one
tenth of one percent of this oil is lost at sea. 4 This translates to
about seven million barrels of oil annually being discharged into the
sea in one way or another.

There are about four thousand tankers in

the world fleet with an average age of eleven years. 5 Some of these
tankers are safe and carefully run, yet seldor.. controlled by law.
Others are obsolete and negligently operated by crews of questionable
skill and experience.

6

These

tar~ers,

while enroute,

dischar~e various

amounts of oily waste from tank washings, ballast water and bilges.
Collisions, groundings,

~ld

other casualties frequently release large

quantities of oil, generally close to shore.

The spectacular dis-

asters that have occurred in the last few years in the course of prod~cticn ~d shipp~ng

have attracted much attention and adverse publicity.

Production and transportation of oil, to meet the demands of increased industrialization around the world, is bour.d to increase at
rates that will drastically change the Ficture of control cf oil
pollution at sea.
Natural j-'olh.:tion.

Accidental and intentional discharges
2

incident to production and
the sea.

h~dling

ere not the only source of oil on

Natural faults--crecks in the ocean floor in the vicinity of

oil deposits--al10w oil uncer pressure to seep into the water at various
locations.

There are several natural leaks in the Caribbean and off

the coast of Caiifornia.

For centuries these natural faults have been

discharging oil which has

suose~uently washed

up and polluted beaches.?

Today they may be sources of occasional slicks of undetermined origin.
Effects.

It is difficult at best to evaluate the biological

and chemical damages of oil pollution, but the physical effects are
graphically evident in the blackened beaches and coastlines around the
world and in the floating "tar balls" ""f-ound in mid-ocean.
dramatically visible effect
~hatever

~~et

8

It is this

has stirred public concern.

the underlying cause, the fact remains that oil has been

and is being discharged onto the sea and in nany cases washed up onto
public and private beaches, and unknown damage is being done to delicate
marine life cycles.

Thus, prevention of such darr.age is high on the list

of priorities for both national and international concern.
In the face of the ever

incre~sir.g

potential for pollution,

President Nixon has pledged that federal agencies v.i.ll take the lead
in pollution abate~ent programs. 9
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the impact on the
Navy of this intense public concern with oil pollution.

3

CHAPTEit 1
.INTRODUCTION
A cursory glance at any of today's newspapers will probably
disclose one or two articles on pollution problems.
there will be as well, several

advertise~ents

by

Additionally,

co~mercial

firms,

the government, or ecology groups espousing their programs for
improving the environment and appealing for help from the individual.
This increasing concern with tte environment has resulted in extensive
progr~s

being undertaken by both industry and government to reduce,

prevent and eventually eliminate pollution.

During the last five

years alone, three amendments have been enacted to strengthen the
Federal ~ater Pollution Control Act,l and no less than three international agreements have been signed or brought into force to con.

trol pollut10n at sea.

:2

Much of this legislation is directed towards controlling oil
pollution.

Just what is behind this current wave of concern and

what has occurred to generate it?
Production.

The highly industrialized nature of today's

world has created an ever increasing demand for fossil fuels.
World production of oil in 1969, for example, was over fifteen
billion

bar~els,3

almost double the 1960 production of about 7.8

billion barrels. 4 Twenty-two nations produced 17% of the 1969 production, about 2.2 billion barrels, from offshore wells. 5 The well
known 3anta 3arbara Channel incident and several recent oil spills
in the Julf of ,·.exico have focussed public attention on the hazards
1

of offshore production.

Increasing production in this area will

add significantly to the problems of oil pollution control at sea.
TranSDortation.

Approximately 60% of the present world

production of oil is transported by sea and it is estimated that
one tenth of one percent of this oil is lost at sea.

6

This trans-

lates to about seven million barrels of oil annually being discharged
into the sea in one way or another.

There are about four thousand

tankers in the world fleet with an average age of eleven years.?
Some of these tankers are safe and carefully run, yet seldom controlled by law.

Others are obsolete and negligently operated by

crews of questionable skill and experience. 8 These t~~ers, while
enroute, discharge various amounts of oily waste from tank washings,
ballast water and bilges.

Collisions, groundings, and other casualties

frequently release large quantities of Oil, generally close to shore.
The spectacular disasters that have occurred in the last few years

.

in the course of production and shipping have attracted nmch attention
and adverse publicity.
Production and transportation of oil, to meet the demands of
increased industrialization around the world, is bound to increase
at rates that will drastically change the picture of control of oil
pollution at sea.
Natural Pollution.

Accidental and intentional discharges

incident to production and handling are not the only source of oil
on the sea.
of oil

Natural faults--cracks in the ocean floor in the vicinity

deposits--allo~ oil

various locations.

under pressure to seep into the water at

There are several natural leaks in the Caribbean
2

and off the coast of California.

For centuries these natural faults

have been discharging oil which has subsequently washed up and polluted
beaches. 9 Today they Eay be sources of occasional slicks of undetern.i.ned origin.
Effects.

Is is difficult at best to evaluate the biological

and chemical damages of oil pollution, but the physical effects are
graphically evident in the blackened beaches and coastlines around
10
the world and in the floating "tar balls" found in mid_ocean.
It
is this

dran~tically

visible effect that has stirred public concern.

Whatever the underlying cause, the tact remains that oil has
been and is being discharged onto the sea and in many cases washed
up onto public and private beaches, and unknown damage is being done
to delicate

~arine

life cycles.

Thus, prevention of such damage is

now and will continue in the future to be high on the list of priorities
for both national and international concern.
In the face of the ever increasing potential for pollution,
President Nixon has pledged that federal agencies will take the lead
ll
in pollution abatement programs.
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the impact on the
Navy of this policy, with specific emphasis on oil pollution, which
has been generated by the intense public concern with ecology and
the environrr,ent.

:3

CHAPTER II
THE NAVI PRO.8.LEM

The Navy faces an imrr.ense potential for oil pollution.

A review

of the Navy's basic operation situation and requirements will give
some appreciation of the magnitude of the problem -.
Operations.

The Navy operates some seven hundred ships,

n.ost of which use hydrocarbon fuels, from thirteen major United States
port areas and nine overseas bases .l~. Of the United. States bases,
twelve are in harbors that have major oil traffic, and seven of those
twelve have traffic exceeding one hundred million barrels annually. 2
(The least of any port is twenty-two million barrels annuallJ')
Although it is the Navy's problem under consideration here, it must
be kept in mind that the oil pollution problems are mutually shared

.

with commercial interests •
Navy ships and stations are constantly subject to public
scrutiny and are perceived as a IDQjor source of oil pollution.

Deploy-

ments and home-comings are frequently items of local news interest.
Navy bases are generQ11y located in easily accessible areas and are
often open to public visiting.

This is in cor.trast to :'erchant

ships which normally dock in industrial areas of the city, out of
general view of the public.

Additionally, Navy ships in large nun.ber-s

are routinely in port for long periods of tin:e, con pared to merchants
which frequently spend less than a day at the dock.
nature to focus

at~ention

It is only hurr-an

on those problems that can be readily seen.

Thus the Navy, ever present in large numbers in the harbor, is easily
identified with visible oil pollution.
4

Fuel

~eguirements.

The Navy uses about sixty-four million

barrels of all types of fuel annually.)~ 'Nhen it is cons Lder-ed that
each barrel is handled at least five times before it is consumed, the
magnf.tude of the
-,

!~otential

for spills becomes even more apparent.,

For exac.pl.e , the sixty-four million barrels beccmes three hundred
twenty million or more in

terrr~

of pollution risk potential.

Add to

this the fact that most Navy oil spills occur in the harbor, where
physical effects are

~st

severe, and it becomes obvious that the

Navy must be extremely careful to prevent oil spills.
Procurement and Handling.

Handling this enormous amount

of fuel to keep the Navy's many ships, aircraft, and shore stations
operating entails many steps that add to the risk of pollution.
Following a shi.praent, of fuel through the supply system from purchase
to delivery aboard ship will best illustrate the extent of the
potential for pollution.
Once the fuel is purchased, Ravy interest in it starts ',o1ith the
loading at the refinery into vessels operatec or chartered by the
hilitary Sealift CorJrr.and.

The oil is delivered to one of the Kavy

"fuel farms" located around the world where it is stored ready for
issue.

It is at this point that Navy personnel first take physical

possession and control of the oil.
Distribution of the fuel to individual shir-s takes place at the
"fuel farm" piers or is piped to normal case piers.
it is necessary to refuel large ships
draft

liffiit~tions

fro~

In SOIT.e ports

small yard oilers due to

at normal refueling piers.

Using yard oilers adds

only one additional step in the fuel handling process, but due to the

5

large capacities of ships requiring this method, it may take several
trips to complete the refueling process.

Similarly, another step is

added in the distribution system by large oilers used for underway
replenishment.

rlefueling from these oilers generally occurs outside

territorial waters and in most cases hundreds of miles at sea.
Potential spills in this handling do not constitute a visible

proble~

at this time; however, they do add to the overall pollution of the
sea.
Even after the fuel is aboard the user ship there still exists
the potential for a spill.

Internal handling is required to trim

ship, top off certain tanks, etc., which adds to the risk of a
spill due to personnel error.

This personnel error during internal

handling is the most frequent cause of spills from Navy ships.
For various operational reasons large quantities o! fuel are
often returned to the fuel farm by user ships.

7his fuel is, of

course, reissued to another ship at a later time.
Policies and procedures designed to eliminate spills caused by
personnel error can be set forth at any level, but ir. practice it
will take consciencious supervisors and trained operators to eliminate
this, the

~avy's

weakest link in the oil Follution prevention program.

6

CHAf'!'ER III
Tf.E U2 ;'CT OF NE"

rcucr

Executive Order :1507 has had far reaching effects on the Navy
at all levels of command. The most significant response thus far
is an instruction issued
the

~avy

a.r the

Chief of Naval

Ope~ations,

officially in the pollution prevention field.

getting

This in-

struction establishes the 'avy's environmental quality program and
sets forth Navy-wide policy for pollution prevention.

Briefly it

states that the Navy will:
a) actively participate in a program to protect and
enhance the quality of the envirorur.ent;
b) conform to the provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended, insofar as the act
prohicits the discharge of oil ••• The intent of this
policy is to prohioit the discharge of all waste oil
and oily ~ixtures in all areas except when operational
emergency exists;
c) accelerate the pace of corrective ~easures to ~eet
environmental standards;
d) incorporate environmental pollution prevention
features in basic designs;
e) cooperate with other Federal, 3tat~ and local
agencies engaged in enviror.mental pollution abat.en.ent.,
and cou.ply with related standards ar.d criteria as
are oromul;ated by ~hose a~encies.l
Adhera~ce

to this policy will require that personnel and resources,

currently committed to other projects, be reassigned to environrrlental
quality tasks.

Just to maintain the present level of readiness, some-

one must, assume responsicility for the

ori~inal

assd gnn.ent,s ,

In the

face of reduced military forces and budgets, no new personnel are

7

seen to be available for these jobs.
the increased workload.
carry out its

rr~ssion

Existing

ge~sonnel

must assume

If they cannot, then the Navy's ability to

must suffer.

The ultimate goal of eLU!inating all discharees of waste oil
and oily

rr~xtures

will require larger slop tanks aboard ship.

Space

will have to be allocated to these tanks, resulting in a reduction
of fuel capacity, fighting power, or personnel

co~10rts.

The latter,

seemingly insignificant, is a critical factor associated with two
other high priority defense programs, the retention of trained
personnel and the achievement of an all-volunteer force.

Living

conditions aboard ship are of great concern to the "creature-comfortbred" young

!~en

of today and must be alloted sufficient priority in

allocation of space.
Increasing the pace of corrective measures and incorporating
environmental pollution protection devices in basic design require
increased allocation of funds.
from the Office of

~_anagement

funds from current projects.

If the funds are not forthcoming
and Sudget, the Navy must rechannel
3tate of the art in pollution centrol

is adequate to meet current and future predictable demands, but
without additional funding, progress has to be slow or at the
expense of other programs.
Notwitnstar.dir.3 the space requirements, it has been estimated
that outfitting Navy ships, where feasible, with sewage treatment
fQcilities alone, will cost about ~253 ITlillion.

2 This figure does

not include oil pollution aoatewent features, consequently the
ultinate figure must be appreciably higher.

8

The total

ar.~unt

may

be equivalent to the price of an attack aircraft carrier or at least
three Folaris rr~s5ile submarines.) When viewed in this perspective,
the profound b:p2.ct of a tradeoff such as this becomes evident.
;

Complying 1,o,"ith state and local criteria' for oil pollution
prevention certainly will not have any effect on ships and stations
equipped to preclude all discharges of oil.

However, if local re-

quirements are for specific types of equipment different from that
already installed, there may be considerable cor.flict.
port changes and visits to other areas
conflict with local laws.

ma~r

Also, home

find certain ships in

Attempting to keep track of ",'hat laws

apply where and consider them when planning routine port visits
will severely complicate planning ship movements.
will present

si~ilar

problems.

often required during some

Aircraft operations

Dumping of fuel from

~issions.

~avy

aircraft is

Local laws prohibiting release

of wastes into,the atmosphere could cause cessation of operations in
that locality if strict adherance to those laws is required.

Also

o?eration of high altitUde, supersonic bombers may be in violation
of certain state's laws interned to restrict operation of supersonic
transports.

Not1,o,~thstanding the

legality or lack thereof of

laws, con.p.Li ance \dth t:..em would prOhibit flight in
concerned.

th~

t~ese

airspace

State and local lawmakers could create major obstructions

to Navy operations even if that were not their

int8~tion.

Numerous other directives have also been issued requiring considerable

r-e sccnse

frm; individu;:.l

comn.aads ,

One of these requires

submission of environmental iF.~~ct state~ents prior to taking any
action that

~~y

have significant effects on the environment.

9

4

hnother requires quarterly updating of a report listing all Navy
pollution abatement deficiencies, proposed corrective actions, and
estimated costs.

5

Thus each command is required to consider environ-

mental imp~cts prior to any action, to examine its o~n pollution
problems, and at least make suggestions tor correcting those problems.
Great importance is attached to identifying and evaluating
deficiencies and proposing corrective actions.

For example, the Chief

of Naval Haterial has established a survey team to compile data on all
Naval forces afloat and ashore to evaluate the scope of the Navy-wide
oil pollution problem.

All commands are required to report deficiencies

on a standard form and an inspection

te~

has been established to sample

selected Ships, stations, and support activities to aid in the analysis
of the data collected. 6 The fact that a Navy Commander, with a Naster
Of Science degree in Civil Engineering, is heading the team gives
an insight into the importance attached to the program by high levels
of command.
These and other instructions have created a flurry of activity
at all commands.

Sorr.e of this activity has been productive and has

added significantly to pollution abatement; others have had no effect
on reducing pollution other than just removins it from sight.
In the administrative area, all stations have assigned an

officer with primary responsibility for oil pollution abateffient programs.

Although there is no current requirement for this officer to

have had any forGal oil pollution training, two officers concerned
at one base have had such training and others are
the near future.?

pl~~ing

it in

As new and intricate equipments and removal

10

techniques are devised, it will become ~perative that such training be given to those involved in oollution acaten.errt ,

The number

of supervisory personnel to be t~ained initially is not large and no
major problems are forseen.
In 1970, partially in response to instructions and p2rtly for

legal reasons, most stations began keeping so~e form of record of
oil spills.

8

By simple analysis of the spill records, recurring

weak spots can be pin-pointed and corrective action taken to prevent future spills from the same cause.

l-~aterials

required are

insignificant, but a reasonably responsible person must be assigned
to keep the records and evaluate the data.

In all stations surveyed,

it appears that this area is adequately covered.
Station operating expenses will increase in the near future
(short term) to provide for the disposal of waste oil.
with instructions
fuse at sea

ha~

fro~

the Secretary of the Navy all

In accordance

d~ping

of re-

been discontinued. 9 Until recently it was common

practice for Navy fuel

h~lers

to dump waste oil at sea if the

quality was too low for sale to local salva;:;e firms.
always done within the law--more than fifty miles
little or no notice taKen of the action.

Dumping was

fro~

the coast--with

Early last December about

one-half million gallons of waste oil, dumped by the NaY'/, was driven
by winds and currents and threatened to cor.taminate local Florida
beaches .10 Public concern was aroused and the d'JJ..ping practice revealed.

It really was no secret, it just hadn't gotten public

interest until then.

As a result of the stronJ public opposition

and the new Navy policy of environmental concern, this dumping

11

procedure has been discontinued.

It is interesting to note that

disposal of the oil b,,- a waste oil dealer would have cost the Navy
only

~5COO

while clean-up operations, had the oil reached shore,

would probably have been many times that Wtount, and possibly the
loss of

favorab~e

The

dQ~ping

public opinion has already exceeded that

~ount.

now prohibited applies to refuse collected in

port for disposal at sea.

It does not pertain to

nor~y

bilge water and refuse retained aboard while in port.

accumulated

Ships are

encouraged to make use of local facilities for trash and garbage
and, as an interim measure to reduce the potential for coastal
pollution, local ccca.ands are requiring ships to refrain from pumping bilges within one hundred miles of the coast .11 Kavy-wide policy
prohibits pumping of any oily mixture within one hundred miles of the
nearest l~d in areas covered by the International Convention for
12
This Navy proPrevention of ?ollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954.
hibition is necessary inasmuch as warships are otherwise exempt from
the provisions of the co~vention. These provisions create little
difficulty for ships; meeting them requires only delaying pumping
for a few hours.

This simple procedure substantially reduces the

possibil.ity of any of the oily J:,ixture reaching the beaches and at
the sarr,e time allows for easier biodegradation of the oil.

This

~olicy is auequat,e to meef present regulations and public opi.ni.on

demsnda, but permittin5 dtL.ping at sea still adds to the overall
Follution of the ocean anC may be harn~ul to marine life.

As the

ulti~~te goal of ~linanatiug all intentional discharges beco~e5 a

reality these restrictions will cease to have any effect on Navy
ships.
12

Procedures have been established and

eq~pment

provided to re-

duce immediately this intentional disposal of oily waste at sea.

Oil disposal r:"ngs and sludge barges are in u,je at various bases to
l)
collect wastes in port.
Oily wastes can then be disposed of ashore
or reprocessed.

~~orfolk

Naval Base has a waste burning furnace in

which combustiole wastes of all kinds are burned to produce steam for

.

var10US uses.

14

Follution is reduced J the disposal problem and costs

eliminated, and useful energy obtained.

SiJrilar systems at bases

around the world could improve operating efficiency and save the
Navy millions of dollars.
Utilization of civilian contractors for waste oil disposal
may create huge administrative problems as well as
for the NaV'.{.

This is due to a

~rovision

that the contractor's ultimate disposal

increas~ng

costs

that the Navy ascertain

~eets

all applicable

poll~tion control requirements. 15 Executing a contract ·~th a
disposal fir~ ~~ not be sufficient to ensure that compliance J and
ultimately the ~avy may have to inspect disposal facilities and
witness the processing to co~~ly with the instruction.
incident in &~ode Island

A recent

exemplifies the difficulties of govern-

ment supervision of the contractor.

ifuen a

s~ip

in distress was

intentionally put aground in Narragansett Bay to prevent further
d~~age, a contractor was ~ired to pump out oily water from the ship

to prevent the rr,ixture f'r-or, polluting the bay.

The contractor, in

violLtion of his co~tract ·~th the city in which he is licensed,
dUIT.ped this oily waste into a sanitary land fill, WDere it now

-

threatens to run into a nearby, already critically polluted creek.

I)

16

Notwitnstu.ndi:1g
t~e

oil will

t~;e

run-off into the creek, the possibility that

ultL~ately

seep into the soil and

cont~ate

ground water is perhaps even mre important than the creek.
point

~ere

is that the contrGctor,

with a direct interest in

hi~ed

~revention

the
The

and supervised by people

of oil pollution, violated

his contract, and disposed of the oil in an unacceptable manner.
Ensuring tha.t contractors meet local disposal regulations will be
a formidable task for

~avy

officials.

In an effort to curb harbor pollution, refueling procedures
have also been made
must be

~a.intained

~.ore

stringent.

Direct telephone communication

between the ship and the pier by a special watch

posted at the fueling valve.

He is in a position to aecure the

valve if a dangerous situation occurs that may lead to an oil spill
(such as excessive fueling pressure) or if a spill actually occurs.
This procedure involves two men at least, and takes a ~inimum of
time to set up, but could be invaluable for ~imizing a spill if
trouble should develop.l?
Contingency plans and instructions are in effect or are being
developed for most oases.

These directives assign responsibility

to various 5rouPS and iLdividuals for emergency clean-up operations.
As each ba.se is differeLt, the plans vary, but all are adequate.
iiuch improver-.ent in military and. civilian response capability could
be achieved if all bases (or Naval Districts) were required to
establish a plan based on toe Natd onaL Cont mtency ::lan and coordinated
with the Co<.:.st:1u..rd and local governr..ent.

14

This would provide lar ge

harbor ar-eas wi t.II a central Kavy organization for r.:.e.jor oil spill
action.

T:lis is a.L.ost mandatory if tile

self-contained clean-up capability.
streamline
:

coordin~~ed

:~avy

is to achdeve a

riaditionally it would help

operations where the Navy was called in to

assist in control of a civil spill.
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CfL..PTEn IV

EstilI'.<:.i.ting .ieoutr-eeent s ,

The Chief of Naval ¥.aterial is

currently cor:dt;.cting a study to ascertain the needs and estim:i.te the
l
costs of providing an integral clean-up capability to all bases.
Results of this study are expected in June 1971.
Projected Costs.

If one oil skimmer and two thousand feet

of contairur.ent boom are to be supplied to only the major base areas
referred to earlier, the cost of initial outfitting will run at least
one million dollars.

Depending on the type of equipment and the level

of accessibility required, costs
figure set forth here.

~ay

be

~any

times the optimistic

For exarr.?le, the Hampton aoads area has been

counted only once, while it actually contains nine bases.
time by water

~etween

bases is up to three hours.

land taKes about one-half that time.

The

S8rr.e

re~uire

Annu~l

trip by

.3ufficiently prompt action to

contain and remove a spill in time to prevent major coastal
may

Travel

da~age

three or more complete sets of equiPffient.
maintenance and replacement costs and man-hours involved

are impossible to estimate at the level of this paper, but they most
certainly will be substantial.
submittin~,

Inestirr.able also are the costs of

handling and receiving reports, and revision of directives

and procedures as experience grows.
Cost Sffectiveness.

The cost of supplying pollution abate-

ment equipment to each base in sufficient quantity to combat any
possible spill is disproportionate to the require~ents of day to day
16

operations.

:r'or example, at the bases surveyed, the largest recorded

spill thut occurred during the period 1 July 1970 to 1 Karch 1971 was
esti1:.ated at one thousand gallons and was the result of material
failure during a storm.

This spill far exceeded all others which

averaged twenty-five to fifty gallons, occurred about twice a week,
and generally were emitted by snips transferring fuel internally.2
Clean-up of this "normal" spill requires only sufficient absorbents
to collect the oil, and manpower, usually supplied by the ship
generating the spill, to scoop up the saturated absorbents.
of the absorbent is accomplished ashore.

~ajor

~isposal

equipments are not

required nor would they be particularly effective in close quarters
around the piers.

Excer::t for the occasional large spill, major

equipments will oe of i..:.se only for clean-up of an occasional spill
from ships anchored in open or partly protected roadsteads.

Con-

tainment of the oil could be effected, then la:ge equipment used to
remove it.

Other than this, large eq,uipment ·Nill probably sit idle

for long perioas, hopefully years at a time.

However, periodic

maintenance and operator training will be re;uired.

From personal

experience, equipments left idle frequently fall into a state of
poor repair until a crisis requiring their use occurs.
then of little use for their intended pur?ose.

They are

It could be argued

that fire fighting equi~~ents are maintained in generally excellent
cor-dition although idle most of the tiffie.

However, this operation

requires Lar-ge numbers of men permanently assigned to the task.
Providing con.par-ao.Le number's of t.r-ai.r.ed personnel to operate and

~aintain the pollution apparatus for exclusive Navy use is prohibitive
from a cost effectiveness standpoint.
17

Alternatives.

An acceptable alternative would be to

~ro-.

vide limited equipment capable of assisting ships in removing the
small spill or containing the large spill,

&n~

then ccntractir.g with

civilian firms for clean-up on a "nen-required oasis.

111e drawback

is the current shortage of equiPffient on the civilian market and
possible excessive time delays in transporting
scene.

equ~pment

to the

A qUick reaction capability for minor spill removal siFilar

to the above suggestion is a goal established by the Chief of Naval
Operations,3 but at the present time it appears inadequate due to
the lack of civilian equipment as back up for major clean-up operations.

(In the New England area, for exaapl.e; there is only one
4-

eivilian skimmer available for oil removal.)

A second, more desirable solution from the standpoint of an
integral Navy clean-up capability and favorable public relations,
is for the :\avy. to maintain equipments thi:!.t would also be available
to the civilian

cow~unity

shore facilities.

to handle spills from

co~mercial

ships or

Legislation would have to be enacted to provide

for such a syst.em and to strean:line coordination with other federal
agencies

Lnvo.ived ,

Requests for assistance of I\avy equipment must

now be handled at the departmental level, a time-consuming process.

5

The equipment would be available for immediate use for occasional
Kavy s~ills requiring it and would be justified on a cost-effectiveness
basis due to IT.ultiple users.

Reimbursement to the Navy could come from

a contingency fund or directly fro@ the using a~ency. Sorr.e economic
efficiency will probably result as civilian corporations and state
and local agencies will probably not buy their own equipment if
federally operu.ted and maintained equipment is readily available.
18

Helicopter

~ssistance.

Depending on the size and type of

equipments, time late at the scene of a spill could be reduced through
the use of Navy helicopters which are available at all but one of the
east coast Naval bases.
sJ~tem

similar
System).

6

The Coast Guard currently is operating a

called ADAPTS (Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer

It consists of air transportable, submersible transfer

pumps, a 40 hp diesel engine, hoses, and a collapsable rubber storage
tank.

The equipment is flown to the scene and parachuted to the ship

in distress.

Oil

re~ainins

aboard the vessel can be loaded into the

rubber storage tank to preclude leakage from the ship.

Although the

rubber storage tank is too heavy to be carried by the helicopter, the
engine, pumps, and hoses can be handled easily.
reason why similar equipment to remove oil
be designed for helicopter delivery.

fro~

There is no apparent
the surface couldn't

Use of the helicopter could

reduce time from one-fourth to one-tenth of that required to deliver
equipment by surface means.

This could be a significant factor even

if the helicopter is used only for transporting containment devices.
Such a system might include a compressed gas inflated containment
boom tnat could be lowered to the ship and deployed by one of the
ship's own small boats.

};ajor abateffient capability maintained by

the Navy would be enhanced considerably by incorporation of helicopter
delivery, a method not generally available to non-military interests.
Effectivene3s of Existing Capabilities.

As public concern

over oil pollution has been ~ounting, base co~~.anders have not been
waitin~ idly for the results of the surveys and studies and the
pro~ulgation of policy from Washington.
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Considerable action has

been taken at the local level to provide adequate clear.-up capabf Lf.t.Les,
Under the direction of the

Enviror~ntal Control

officer, the pollution

abatement procedures and equipments on hand are adequate for the normal
spill.

Additional equipment and supplies are being procured by rr.ost

stations to further iIr.prove capabilities.

Absorbents are stocked

locally in sufficient quantity for routine

requir~ents

and mechanical

containment devices are available in various amounts from a few hundred
7
to two thousand feet.
Even the latter amount is inadequate for some
applications.

For

eX&~ple,

it is insufficient to encircle a large

attack aircraft carrier if required to contain a spill.

Several

bases have mechanical skiJr.mers, either converted Navy reserve small
craft or one-of-a-kind experimental devices.

One thing all these

skimmers have in conanon is that they are all "jury rigged", interim
devices.

They are adequate for small spills in calm water but are

hopelessly inadequate for large spills in open areas of the harbor,

.

partic~larly

in adverse weather cor.ditions.

Instructions for one

skimmer state that operation is hazardous at all times and extremely
dangerous at r.:'ght.

8

Consider a ship the size of a destroyer running around near the
Dumplings ih Narragansett Bay in seas of three to five feet.

A spill

amountir.g to only ten percent of its capacity would put twenty-one
tnousand gallons of black oil on the water.

Recovery of the oil

spilled before a cont~ination of nearby beaches and shoreline occurs
is hard to imasine.

In fact, the combir.ed resources of Newport Naval

Base and all of the (~ew England region would be insufficient to contain

20

and remove the oil before it reached shore.

The cest that could

oe

expected would ae a reduction of the extent and severity of the
contamination
co~~anders

~d

rapid clean-up of the beaches.

are aware of the problem and are

Although base

atteL~ting

to obtain

ajequate equipment, without considerable additional fundir.g, capabilities will continue to remain

l~ted.
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CHa?TBR V

Jeneral Gperations.
under the Department of the
of Defense waterborne

The

~aVYJ

co~erce

}~litar.Y

Sealift

Co~nand, (K3C)

is responsible for all Department

and as such has been affected con-

siderably by anti-pollution legislation and pub.Li,c attitudes.

~:SC

operates about fifty-five tankers, twenty-four of which are government owned and the remainder chactered from civilian companies.
During the six months from July thru

Dec~ber

1

1970, these ships

carried a total of about eighty million barrels of various fuel
.
2
o~l products.
This is the equivalent of about one-hundred trips
of the Torrey Canyon, or in pollution potential about two hundred
Torrey Canyon Pollution Potential
potential

thi~

Ur~ts

annually.

~ith

a pollution

great and the prooability that an incident

~ould

bring unfavorable publicity to the Navy, the Departffient of the Navy
and the hilitary 3ealift Cona.and have been deeply concerned about
pollution prevention.
hilitary Sealift Com.and, in keeping with the intent of
~ecutive

Order 11507, is progressing rapidly with pollution pre-

vention programs.

Many new policies and procedures have been

adopted wi thin the last year.

.~o:ne

of these pclicies and procedures

will have far rea.ching effects on both the
combatant, types.

:·~:;C

ships and the Navy

Inaemuch as ;.3C carries all Department of Defense

fuels, all rrilitary activities will feel some effects.

Federal

Although not all sections of the

~teguirements.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act apply to public vessels, the
Commander- LSC has directed that all

~.3C

ships and vessels under

bareboat charter shall observe all provisions of the Act.)
regulation

requ~res

This

operators of E3C vessels to report any discharges

of oil that are in violation of the Act.

Tnis procedure will at

least allow some clean-up action to be taken on a spill that otherwise might go unreported.
Local Regulations.

Although local governments have no

jurisdiction over federally operated vessels, and their laws vary
widely from port to port,

f~C

vessels have been directed to comply

with local regulations. 4 To implement this policy ~~C periodically
~epresenta-

issues notices containing pertinent local regulations.

tive of these is a December 1970 notice alerting ships of the air
pollution requirements of several west coast ports.

5

Compliance

by ships will probably not significantly affect their operation
but keeping track of local regulations and

disserr~nating

the informa-

tion will be a major administrative task for XSC.
Departmental Regulations.

Consideration of pollution

potential is required in planning L3C activities.
instruction,

ay separate

~3C

activities must submit environmental impact state6
ments in the same manner as operatir.g and support forces.
Load-On-Top Procedures.

l".3C now requi.r-es comc Li ance with
.t
.,
7
load-on-top procedures, called the clean seas code, by all 1 s S~1pS.
In many ca3es this will r2sult in a reduction of
capacity on some le5s of a voyage.
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c~r60

carrying

3pecific instructions have been

shi~s

issued for

for tank cleaning procedures and consolidation of

wastes in a slop tank.

If no facilities are available to offload

waste in a particular port, it is to be retair.ed on board
s~ch t~,e

~til

as it can be discharged to suitable shore receiving

faci~ties.

Carried to extremes, it is easy to visualize a tanker

carryins more waste than clean cargo.

iJith t-anker- capacities

partially reduced by this procedure, more trips will be required
to transport a given Gmount of fuel, thereby increasiug operating
costs.
Deballasting.

}~C

provides information on deballast

facilities to ship masters by publishing a table of the facilities
of over one hundred twenty-five commercial and military fueling
depots around the ·~rld.8 Originally pUblished in April 1970,
rapid construction has already required updating of the list.
Frequent additions are anticipated in the near future as public
concern induces and new laws require
such equi.pmerrt ,

co~ercial

firms to install

i.aintainir.,-s the listing up-to-date will entail

considerable effort and expense.
As these facilities

beco~~

more

r.~Terous

and information more

widely circulated, it is anticipated that Defense Supply Agency
will limit purchases to those producers who maintain adequate
9
deballast facilities ~t their loading ter~~nals•. hdherance to
tiis ?Olicy

'~ll

increase costs to military purchasers due

longer transit times and

lon~er

~o

in port turn around tir,es ir.curred

in offloadin5 slops ond ballast.

As the

nurr~er

of available facilities

increases and offloading procedures improve, it is expected that the
24

effects of this policy will oe gradually reduced.

Costs of operating

deballast facilities will eventually be reflected in higher prices to
all consun.er-s ,
Research and

~evelo:~e~t.

Research is also being cor.ducted

into the feasibility of incor?Orating oil-water separators in existing snips.10

New vessels will probably include such equip~ent and

possibly separate ballast systems.

The difficulty in this program

is designing a system to handle large quantities of oil-water
mixture which may contain many different types of oil in infinite
ratios with the water and developing reliable monitoring equipment.
The problems faced by

~:3C

in meeting pollution control require-

ments are not insurmountable but to achieve success we must accept
the nign costs involved.

The external costs of pollution are

being transformed into internal costs and
eluded in operating budgets.

25

~ltimately

must be in-

I

cknE~i VI
OUTLOOK FOR

TH~

Spills in Foreign fort5.

FU'IUnE
If Navy operations continue at

present levels, oil pollution problems in the
will be of increasing concern to the Navy.

internation~

arena

To preclude major inter-

national incidents, integral clean-up capabilities will have to be
provided to all

~hips

for control of spills in foreign ports.

There

is no aS3urance that foreign ports will be equipped to assist visiting ships with oil spill control.
Resort areas,

freq~ently

visited by Navy

s~ips

for rest

recreation, are extremely sensitive to even small spills.

~~d

On

13 July 1965 the U.3.3. Shan6ri-La, (CVh-38), during a routir.e port
visit spilled an estimated 2400 gallons of black fuel oil off the
l
coast of Cannes, France.
Amazingly, in spite of the fact that
except for carbonized sand no other abatement supplies

~ere

avail-

able and much of the oil reached the beaches, removal efforts were
successful and no permanent damage occurred to the beaches or the
tourist trade. * However, it isn't likely that the Navy will be
this

fortun~te

in the future.

Reasonable planning must include

having adequate pollution control equipment available.

Provision

of oil containrr.ent booffi to isolate the spill in the vicinity of
the snip would have made clean-up operations

infinite~

easier and

presented the picture of an effective Navy capability.

*Clean-up took only one day and consisted of applying sinking
agents cf'fsnor-e, runneLl.tn« the oil reac~in'!, shore into trenche~
du~ alons t~e beach where it was physically removed, and replac~ng
blackened sand.
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This spill, during the height of the
the eve of 3astille Day, could

tou~st

season and on

permanently damaged both the

h~ve

United States reL.tions with France and the Navy's public image.
h similGr incident today, when U.3. forces are

atte~pting

to main-

tain a "low profile" abroad and when mc.:ny groups would like to keep
the u•o ,

l~avy

out of their part of the world,

migh~

be even more

disastrous and have adverse effects on national security.
Assistance from Central Deoots.
absorbents stocked at
Loch,

~~l

m~jor

Containment booms and

bases, such as nota, Naples, and Holy

prove only marginally effective in asaisting removal of

a spill in other than their local areas, due to the time element
involved.

For example, if helicopter delivery of this equipment

were available, as suggested earlier for domestic employment, it
is estllu&ted that time

fro~

initial request to delivery of supplies

to Cannes fro,E Naples Could be at least six hours.
clearly unacceptable.

Such a delay is

If, however, the oil was already contained

by equipment on hand, short delays while awaiting delivery of
sk~~~rs

or otier

re~oval

equipment by air would be entirely satis-

factory.
Ship Carried Equipment.
discussion that all ships visiting
with at least

conta~r~ent

also have sufficient

temporary

b~sis

forei~n

equipment.

e~uipment

any ship in its sroup.

It is evident from the above
ports must be provided

Large ships

s~ould

probably

to contain and remove a spill from

Smaller sh i.ps could load equi.pment, en a

when conducting independent visits to

equipped ports.
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non-~avy

Rep~esentdtive
~~nimum

equipment for a large ship

~i~~t

include as a

two thousand feet of inflatable oil containment boom, a

vacuum type

skirr~er

and

purr~s

suitable for use from a

40 foot utility

boat, some sort of collapsable storage tank, and sufficient absorbents
to remove final traces of oil.
~ght

Smaller ships on independent duty

carry only the boom and absorbents.

Initial purchase costs

will be astronomical but precluding the alternative, a major international incident, appears worth
Prevention Methods.

t~e

price.

Although spills resulting from personnel

error, similar to the one described above are not likely to be

co~

pletely eliminated, there is much that can be done to avoid or reduce
damage.

For example, in ports where it is aVailable, containrrent

boom should be rigged in such a manner as to isolate a ship prior to
commencing routine fueling operations.
then be totally contained and easily

Any resultant spill would

re~oved

of contarrination of adjoining coastline.

with little or no danger

Costs of operation in this

manner should be minimal and easily absorbed in operating budgets.
This procedure is now in use in Portland, Kaine and has proven
successful. 2
An even siI.pler procedure to avoid adverse publicity and damage

in resort areas would oe to

~rohibit

internal transfer of fuel except

to service tanks, while in resort ports.

If trim couldn't be adjusted

by transferring water, then a slight out-of-trim condition could be
accepted as the price to help avoid pollution incidents.
Installation of automatic shut-off devices in overflow lines or
overflow lines leading into slop tanks might be another easy way to
avoid accidental spills.

With such devices inst~ed, pumping oil

overboard during internal transfer will become difficult if not
impossible.
Fuel Conversion.

The Navy will probably convert all
someti~e

non-nuclear ships to a distillate fuel
This change will

e~ate

in the near future.

the gross contamir.ation and blackening

of oeaches resulting from a black oil spill but it brings its own
unique prcal.ems ,

Distillate ruel, a higher volatile fraction of

crude oil, is more dar.Aging to marine life than the heavier
fractions.)

Thus, while distillate is less of a problem from

the physical aspect, it is potentially more hazardous to marine
life.

The fact that distillate fuel is

relative~y

undetectable

may allow the accidental discharge to continue for a considerable
t~~

before it is discovered and secured and may also allow small

spills to go cOmpletely undetected, unreported and uncorrected.
Research and Development.

The possibility exists that

all sewage, garoage, (except metallic items), and other conbustible
wastes, including oily water mixtures

rr~ay

be converted to water and

harmless gasses aboard ship, there by eliminating all intentional
disposal of wastes at sea.

Research is being conducted into a pro-

cess that will make this possible (the Zimmerman Frocess).4 This
system essentially oxidizes all sewage and combustible wastes by.
a high

te~perature, fl~eless

less gasses.

process which yields water and harm-

Such a device aboard sni.p could provide auxilliary

heat and fresh water as by-products to its primary function.

It

is possiole that a similar combustion process may be developed for
main propulsion power.

Then wastes would sin'ply become additional

fuel, resulting in the reduction of overall cor.ver.tional fuel requirements.
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Research is also being conducted

~~der

Office of

contract into biological degradation of oil as
1wo parallel studies are being

method.

~

~aval

Research

oil slick removal

co~ducted,

one into the use

of natural marine bacteria and the other into the use of yeast. 5
Elimination of slicks in this manner is certainly more desirable
than by use of dispersants or sirlking agents, but it also has drawbacks.

Concentrations of bacteria after the oil is consumed

m~

have

adverse effects on biological food chains much as the concentrations
of nutrients in some waters has resulted in severe algae pollution.
The possibility is very real for a similar situation to evolve from
oil eating bacteria.
Abatement Operations.

'Hhen the studies discussed earlier

are evaluated and decisions made as to equipment procureLent, it is
anticipated

t~at

the Navy will ultimately possess sufficient capability

to become the major pollution abatement company.

Although current

policy does not intend that the Navy supply abatement equipment for
all sectors of industry and government, emergency operations will
undoubtedly result in the use of Navy equipment.
Navy will

co~e

Ultirr.ately the

to be relied on to provide the equipment.

From that

point on, like it or not, the Navy will be the major operator of
abatement equipment.

The best action is to plan now for Navy

participation at this level so that funds can be allocated and plans
forrr,ulated to put the

syste~

in operation at the earliest possible

time.
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